まず小笠原晋也氏ブログより、次の文を掲げよう。
そもそも，精神分析とは何か？
精神分析は，言語に住まう存在としての人間主体存在の実践的現象学です．
存在の真理の現象学的構造に応じて，精神分析の塾は二重の機能を有します．ひとつは，存在における精神分析にかかわるもの，もうひとつは，存在事象そのもの全体における精神分析にかかわるもの．それらは，ラカンが「内包における精神分析」ならびに「外延における精神分析」と呼ぶものにそれぞれ対応しています．
内包における精神分析，すなわち，存在における精神分析とは，精神分析の実践そのものです．あなたが精神分析を経験する（いわゆる個人分析を受ける）とき，あなた自身の存在が問題になります．それこそが，精神分析の本質です．
他方，外延における精神分析，すなわち，存在事象そのもの全体における精神分析とは，社会において精神分析を現在化するものの総体です．それは，精神分析という名称そのものを始めとして，精神分析に関するあらゆる言説を含みます．
したがって，東京ラカン塾もふたつの機能を果たします．
ひとつは，精神分析の経験の可能性を万人に提供すること，つまり，いわゆる個人分析の求めに応ずることです．それは，あなたが最終的に精神分析家になることを始めから目ざしているか否かにかかわりません．
もうひとつは，フロイト・ハイデガー・ラカンのボロメオ結びに準拠しつつ精神分析の主体の存在に関する問いを展開することを試みるセミネールの実施です．東京ラカン塾のセミネールは原則的に一般公開であり，誰でも参加することができます．10月に開講する予定です．
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◆最晩年のラカンの正統的かつ悲劇的なトーンでの告白とされるラカンの言葉（ジジェク『LESS THAN NOTHIG』「CHAPTER 11 The Non‐All, or, the Ontology of Sexual Difference」よりの孫引き。
先に、この章には、次のような文もあることを示して置こう。
in his analytic of Dasein, Heidegger totally ignores sexuality. (Typically, when philosophers deal with Freudian notions like “castration,” they read them as ontic metaphors for the ontological a priori of our finitude, limitation, powerlessness…)
さてラカンの告白の文をとりあえず私訳してみよう。
ボロメオ結びの隠喩は、そのもっとシンプルな状態で、不十分である。それは隠喩を濫用している。というのは、実際上、想像界、象徴界、現実界を支えるものは、なにもないからだ。私が今言っていることの本質的なことは性関係はないということである。性関係はない、――というのは想像界、象徴界、現実界があるからであり、これは私が敢えて言おうとしなかったことだ。しかしながら、私はそう言った。それは私が間違っていた証拠である。けれど私はシンプルに、そこに滑りこませるままになっていた。これは当惑させることだ、さらに、それは苛立たせる以上のことだ。ひどく苛立たせて、正当化されないことだ。これが今、私にとって事態がいかにみえるかということである。これが、私はあなたがたに告白することである。それでは！
以下は、ジジェクのこの文の前後のコメントを原文のまま掲げる。
The reason Lacan, in his later teaching, turned to the theme of knots was precisely in order to think the non‐relationship as embodied in a paradoxical element (which would vaguely fit the singular universal, the “part of no‐part”).90 Here enters the Borromean knot, consisting of three circles intertwined in such a way that no two are directly connected but are held together only through the third, so that if we cut the third knot, the other two will also be disconnected—in short, there is no relationship between any two circles. What is this third circle? The objet a? The sinthome? The symbolic order itself? Here Lacan, at the very end of his teaching, reached a deadlock to which, in an authentically tragic mode, he openly confessed:
《The metaphor of the Borromean knot is, in its most simple state, inadequate. It abuses the metaphor, because there really is no thing which supports the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. What is essential in what I am saying is that there is no sexual relationship. That there is no sexual relationship because there is an imaginary, a symbolic, and a real, this is what I did not dare to say. But I nonetheless said it. It is evident that I was wrong, but I simply let myself slide into it. This is disturbing, it is even more than annoying. It is even more annoying that it is not justified. This is how things look to me today, and this is what I confess to you. All right!》 91
（Jacques Lacan, seminar of January 9, 1979, in Le séminaire, Livre XXVI: La topologie et le temps (unpublished).）
Two things should be noted here. First, retroactively, one can see where the obvious mistake lay: the Borromean knot works as a metaphor only if we think the three circles as simultaneous, intertwined on the same surface. (The only way to save this model would be to add a fourth element holding the three together, which Lacan did with his notion of the sinthome holding together the ISR triad.) Second, why was Lacan, by his own confession, wrong to say that there is no sexual relationship because there is an imaginary, a symbolic, and a Real? Because the three are not given simultaneously as a triad—they rather function like the Kierkegaardian triad of Aesthetic‐Ethical‐Religious, where the choice is always between two terms, an either/or; in other words, the three terms do not operate at the same ontological level, so that we encounter a certain minimal temporality: first the antagonism between the Aesthetic and the Ethical; then, with the passage to the Ethical, the antagonism repeats itself in the (new) guise of the jump from the Ethical to the Religious. One can thus even say that, in a weird “negation of the negation,” the Religious is the return of the Aesthetic within the domain of the Ethical: the Religious is non‐non‐Aesthetic.92 Similarly, in Lacan's triad of imaginary‐symbolic‐Real, or in Freud's of ego‐superego‐Id, when we focus on one term, the other two get condensed into one (under the hegemony of one of them). If we focus on the imaginary, the Real and the symbolic get contracted into the imaginary's opposite under the domination of the symbolic; if we focus on R, I and S get contracted under the domination of S.93 What Lacan is struggling with here is how to formulate or formalize an impossible/Real object which keeps the two sexes apart and, simultaneously, is the only thing, a third thing, which indirectly connects the two. Insofar as this object is an obstacle to the identity of each sex, this means that every sex is grounded by its immanent impossibility. The inadequacy of the Borromean metaphor is that it makes it appear as if, when the third circle is cut off, the two other circles (the two sexes) simply wander off, each going its own way—as if the two sexes have some kind of consistency outside of their constitutive difference. How can we think this dependence of the two sexes outside differentiality? In short, the non‐relationship—which had the ambition to affirm the absence of relationship—loses its support. There is no “thing” to support such a … concept … To conclude, the non‐relationship did not find its object, and remains an affirmation which can only be related to its enunciation.94
Lacan's idea of the end or goal of the analytic treatment passes through three main phases which vaguely fit the triad of symbolic, Real, and imaginary: first, the symbolization of the symptoms; then, the violent encounter with the Real; finally, the modest amelioration of our daily psychic economy. Lacan's limitation is clearly discernible in how, in his last decades, he tends to oscillate between two poles which are both “worse,” as Stalin would have put it. Sometimes (exemplarily in his reading of Antigone), he conceives of the ethical act as a kind of “forcing,” a violent act of transgression which cuts into imaginary and symbolic semblances and makes the subject confront the terrifying Real in its blinding destructive power—such traumatic encounters, such penetrations into the forbidden or damned domain, in Antigone, are called ate, and can only be sustained for a brief moment.
もうひとつ、前期ラカンの、アンティゴネーのような存在の深淵を垣間見ることを進めるラカンからの転回を指摘する言葉（同じくジジェク『LESSS THAN NOTHIG』 最終「Conclusion:
The Political Suspension of the Ethical」よりの孫引き）。
ひとは真実のすべてを学ぶ必要はない。わずかで十分だ。
“one does not need to learn all of the truth. A little bit is sufficient.” （ Lacan, “Radiophonie,” in Autres écrits）
ひとは分析をあまりにも遠くまで押しすすべるべきではない。患者が仕合せに生活できると思えば、それで十分である。
“One should not push an analysis too far. When the patient thinks he is happy to live, it is enough.” （J Lacan, “Conférences aux USA,” Scilicet 1976)
For the earlier Lacan, both the ethics of symbolic realization and the ethics of confronting the Real Thing call for the heroic stance of pushing things to the limit in order to leave behind our everyday Verfallenheit, our fallen existence (one must “subjectivize one's own death” by casting off the wealth of imaginary identifications, thereby attaining the limit‐position of a pure subject without an ego; one must violently transgress the very limit of the symbolic order, heroically confronting the dangerous Beyond of the Real Thing). Renouncing this radicalism, the later Lacan re‐conceives psychoanalytic treatment in a much more modest way: “one does not need to learn all of the truth. A little bit is sufficient.”4 Here the very idea of psychoanalysis as a radical “limit experience” is rejected: “One should not push an analysis too far. When the patient thinks he is happy to live, it is enough.”5 How far we are here from Antigone's heroic attempt to attain the “pure desire” by entering the prohibited domain of ate! Psychoanalytic treatment is now no longer a radical transformation of subjectivity, but a local patching‐up which does not even leave any long‐term traces. (Along these lines, Lacan draws attention to the neglected fact that, when Freud met the Rat‐man again, years after his treatment, the latter had totally forgotten about his analysis.) This more modest approach was fully articulated in Jacques‐Alain Miller's reading which focuses on late Lacan: in his last seminars, Lacan leaves behind the notion of “traversing the fantasy” as the concluding moment of the psychoanalytic process; in its place he introduces the opposite gesture of accepting the ultimate non‐analyzable obstacle called the sinthome. If the symptom is a formation of the unconscious to be dissolved through interpretation, the sinthome is the “indivisible remainder” which resists interpretation and interpretive dissolution, a minimal figure or node which condenses the subject's unique mode of enjoyment. The goal of analysis is thus reformulated as “identification with the symptom”: instead of dissolving his unique sinthome, the subject should become aware of it and learn how to use it, how to deal with it, instead of allowing the sinthome to determine him behind his back:
The analytic experience enables us to re‐appropriate our desire. In the best case, one can thus hope to arrive at “wanting what one desires” and “desiring what one wants.” If the experience is brought to its conclusion, it allows us to identify ourselves with our “incurable”: not only to find oneself in it, but to make use of it.6
Through this identification, the opposition of meaning and enjoyment is also overcome in their “synthesis,” that of jouis‐sens (enjoy‐meant, enjoying the sense): the subject is not reduced to an idiotic autistic enjoyment, s/he continues to speak, but his/her talk now functions as a play with semblances, as an empty blah‐blah‐blah which generates enjoyment. This would be Lacan's version of eppur si muove: even after we have seen through imaginary and symbolic semblances, the game goes on in the guise of the circulation of jouis‐sens, the subject is not dissolved in the abyss of the Real.（ZIZEK『LESS THAN NOTHING』）
いずれにせよ、後期ラカンと前期ラカンは一見かなり違うようにみえる。
◆An Interview With Paul Verhaeghe(2011)
Paul Verhaeghe and Dominiek Hoens Translated by Chris
Gemerchak
PV: In Lacan's final theory about the Oedipal Complex, he describes it as a necessary social structure. But he also indicates that it need not by definition be this particular social structure. There does have to be a social structure as protection against pleasure, protection in the sense of a limitation. This is a very different vision than in his seventh seminar where he describes pleasure as transgression of the law. Though the one does not exclude the other. This final theory is indeed a deep reflection on what was present in the nucleus of the seminar on ethics. Now I have forgotten your question.
DH: I could formulate it in another way. Psychoanalytic and also Lacanian theory in its classical form is a theory of neurosis, a theory of the unconscious, a theory of castration, of desire. At a certain point — this is a certain way of reading Lacan, sometimes the break is located in seminar 17 or seminar 20 — Lacan would have changed this starting point, and even abandoned it in favour of a different theory.
一方では、Paul Verhaegheのように最終的な理論は、前期の倫理のセミネールと関連づけようとする試みもあり、Dominiek HoensはセミネールⅩⅦ、あるいはⅩⅩのあいだに前期と後期の断絶があるとする見方もある。また論者によって、三段階にわける議論もあるだろう。
たとえばラカンの娘婿でもあるジャック＝アラン・ミレールは、ラカンの前期をセミネール 1 から 10までの時期（1953-1963）、中期をセミネール 11 から 21 までの時期（1964-1974）、後期を「第三の女」とセミネール 22 から 27 までの時期（1974-1980）としている。（Miller (Jacques-Alain), 2002 Le dernier enseignement de Lacan. La Cause freudienne, 51より）
あるいはまた、いまでも珍重される「エクリ」であるが、藤田博史氏などはこんなことを言っている（べつに彼の言葉を信じなくてもよいのだが）。
ラカンについていうと、いまだに『エクリ』にこだわり続けている人たちが沢山います。「《盗まれた手紙》についてのセミネール」とか「論理的時間と予期される確実性の断言」といった論文にいまだにこだわっている人たちが少なからずいるということに驚いてしまう。勿論どちらも重要な論文であることには変わりありませんが、これが今現在における研究対象になり続けてもらっては困る。ラカンが辿り着こうとしていた場所から振り返れば、それらはいずれも遥か手前にあるものです。つまり通過点に過ぎません。ご存じのように、ラカンのエクリは1966年に出版された本ですから、世に現れてからすでに46年の歳月が流れています。これはラカン中期前半までの思想に相当します。当然のことですが、中期の後半から後期の思想は含まれていません。ラカンにおいて真に問題にしなければならないのはむしろエクリ以後の思想の流れです。にもかかわらず殆どの研究者がエクリという迷路のなかで立ち往生している。
そうではなく、わたしはラカンの中期の後半から始めようと思います。ラカンの年齢でいうと70歳から80歳までの10年間の思想です。したがって、そこにたどり着くまでにやっておくべきこと、その時点ではすでに自明になっていることが少なからずありますが、それは各自で勉強してください、と申し上げておきたいと思います。学問に過剰な優しさは禁物です。（セミネール断章 2012年 11月10日講義より）
小笠原晋也氏が、《東京ラカン塾は，ラカン派精神分析を本当に経験し得る日本で唯一の場所です》（「精神分析を実際に経験すること」）などと書いているのを眺めると、数年前、藤田博史氏と向井雅明氏のあいだで悶着があったーー具体的な内容はあまり知らないがーー、それと同じように、日本ラカン派のあいだでまた悶着が起こるのではないかと、「ワクワク」してしまう……
