「無頭のacephalic知」としての欲動 (ジジェク=ラカン)

以下、 DESIRE: DRIVE = TRUTH: KNOWLEDGE SLAVOJ ZIZEKとそのa la lettreさんHPの試訳欲望:欲動=真理:知」より。

In the "early" phase, from the 1940s to the 1960s, Lacan moves within the coordinates of the standard philosophical opposition between "inauthentic" objectifying knowledge which disregards the subject's position of enunciation, and the "authentic" truth by which one is existentially engaged, affected. In the psychoanalytic clinic, this opposition is perhaps best exemplified by the clear contrast between obsessional neurosis and hysteria.
 The obsessional neurotic lies in the guise of truth. At the level of factual accuracy, his statements are as a rule true, yet he uses factual accuracy to dissimulate the truth about his desire. When, for example, my enemy has a car accident because of a brake malfunction, I go to great lengths to explain to everyone that I was never near his car and am therefore not responsible for the malfunction. While this is true, this "truth" is propagated by me to conceal the fact that the accident realized my desire.
 On the contrary, the hysteric tells the truth in the guise of a lie; the truth of my desire articulates itself in the very distortions of the "factual accuracy" of my speech. When, instead of "I hereby open this session," I say "I hereby close this session," my desire clearly reveals itself. The aim of the psychoanalytic treatment is thus to (re)focus attention from factual accuracy to hysterical lies which unknowingly articulate the truth, and then to progress to a new knowledge which dwells at the place of truth, to a knowledge which, instead of dissimulating truth, gives rise to truth-effects, i.e. to what the Lacan of the fifties called "full speech," the speech in which subjective truth reverberates. This notion of truth, of course, belongs to a long tradition, from Kierkegaard to Heidegger, of despising mere "factual truth."


(ヒステリー)は倒錯とは対照的である。倒錯を特徴づけているのは問いの欠如である。倒錯者は、自分の行動は他者の享楽に役立っているという直接的な確信を抱いてい る。ヒステリーとその「方言」である強迫神経症とでは、主体が自分の存在を正当化するその方法が異なる。ヒステリー症者は自分を<他者>に、その愛の対象 として差し出す。強迫神経症者は熱心な活動によって<他者>の要求を満足させようとする。したがって、ヒステリー症者の答えは愛であり、強迫神経症者のそ れは労働である。



1. /ˌeɪDescription: http://sp.dictionary.com/dictstatic/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngsəˈfælDescription: http://sp.dictionary.com/dictstatic/dictionary/graphics/luna/thinsp.pngɪk/ Description: http://sp.dictionary.com/dictstatic/g/d/dictionary_questionbutton_default.gif headless; lacking a distinct head.
2. without a leader or ruler.

Beginning in the late sixties, however, Lacan focuses his attention more and more on drive as a kind of "acephalic" knowledge which brings about satisfaction. This knowledge involves no inherent relation to truth, no subjective position of enunciation-- not because it dissimulates the subjective position of enunciation, but because it is in itself nonsubjectivized, or ontologically prior to the very dimension of truth (of course, the term ontological becomes thereby problematic, since ontology is by definition a discourse on truth). Truth and knowledge are thus related as desire and drive: interpretation aims at the truth of the subject's desire (the truth of desire is the desire for truth, as one is tempted to put it in a pseudo-Heideggerian way), while construction provides know- ledge about drive. Is not the paradigmatic case of such an "acephalic" knowledge provided by modern science (2)which exemplifies the "blind insistence" of the (death) drive?


Modern science follows its path (in microbiology, in manipulating genes, in particle physics) heedless of cost--satisfaction is here provided by knowledge itself, not by any moral or communal goals scientific knowledge is supposed to serve. All the "ethical committees" which abound today and attempt to establish rules for the proper conduct of gene-manipulation, of medical experiments, etc. -- are they ultimately not desperate attempts to reinscribe this inexorable drive-progress of science which knows of no inherent limitation (in short: this inherent ethic of the scientific attitude) within the confines of human goals, to provide it with a "human face," a limitation? The commonplace wisdom today is that "our extraordinary power to manipulate nature through scientific devices has run ahead of our faculty to lead a meaningful existence, to make human use of this immense power." Thus, the properly modern ethics of "following the drive" clashes with traditional ethics whereby one is instructed to live one's life according to standards of proper measure and to subordinate all its aspects to some all-encompassing notion of the Good. The problem is, of course, that no balance between these two notions of ethics can ever be achieved. The notion of reinscribing scientific drive into the constraints of the life-world is fantasy at its purest--perhaps the fundamental fascist fantasy. Any limitation of this kind is utterly foreign to the inherent logic of science--science belongs to the real and, as a mode of the real of jouissance, it is indifferent to the modalities of its symbolization, to the way it will affect social life.
このような「無頭の」知の範例的ケースは、(死の)欲動の「盲目的執拗性」を例証している現代科学*3によって提供されているのではないだろうか? 現代科学(微生物学や遺伝子操作や粒子物理学)はコストを度外視してその道を歩んでいる――満足はここで知それ自体によって提供されており、科学的知はいかなる倫理や公共の目的にも奉仕していない*4。遺伝子操作や医学実験などについての適正な運営のルールを定めようとしている「倫理委員会」が近頃増えつつあるが、それらのすべての「倫理委員会」は、究極的には、内在的な限界付け(簡潔に言えば、科学的態度に内在的な倫理)を知らない科学の無尽蔵な欲動的-発展を再び刻み付けようとする必死の試みではないだろうか? 「倫理委員会」は人間の目的を制限し、科学に「人間の顔」という限界付けを与えようとしているのだ。近頃の凡庸な叡知は「科学装置を通して自然を操作する私たちの並外れた力は、生きがいのある存在を導いたり、この強大な力を使うための私たちの能力をしのいでいる」と言っている。このように「欲動を追う」現代倫理は、伝統的倫理と衝突する。そこで人は、適切な基準というスタンダードにしたがって人生を送るよう指導され、人生ののすべての側面を、《善》というすべてを包み込む考えに従属させられてしまう。もちろん、問題は、倫理についての二つの考えがバランスをとれないということにある。科学的欲動を生命の制限へと再び刻み付けるという考えは、最も純粋にファンタスム的なものである――これはおそらくファシストの基本的ファンタスムであろう。この類の制限はすべて、科学に内在的な論理とはまったく無縁なものである――科学は現実的なものに属しており、享楽の現実界の一つのモードとして、象徴化のモダリティにはそぐわないし、社会生活に影響を与えるようなやり方にもそぐわないのだ。